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  Economists are often portrayed as heartless—walking, machine-like creatures 
who weigh costs and benefits and, based on those costs and benefits, spew forth policy 
directives—do this; don’t do that. That is not how anyone would describe Bill Vickrey. 
He was an economist with a heart. For him economics was not some abstract theory to be 
used to impress others and win debating points. Instead, it was a set of tools—an 
approach that, if used properly, would make society (and by society Bill meant the large 
majority of the population) better off. From his work in progressive taxation to his work 
on auctions, pricing theory, inflation, and macro stabilization policy, Bill always kept in 
mind that the goal of policy was to design actual workable policies.  
  Bill was not without his abstract moments—he delighted in thinking about 
abstract issues, and his meanderings into those abstract issues were often far ahead of his 
colleagues; they won him a Nobel Prize. But his heart was in applied policy—be it road 
pricing (where he worked both on schemes in which drivers would buy stickers and place 
them on their windshield, and more sophisticated schemes in which electronic devices 
would automatically charge drivers a varying congestion charge) or in changing an 
abstract idea I had about creating a market in rights to change prices into a practical plan 
designed around a set of growth warrants.  
  His first substantial contribution to the literature, Agenda for Progressive 
Taxation, was the epitome of applied policy; it reflected a deep understanding of the 
underlying theory of taxation and a solid command of the tax code. In it he spelled out 
not just why a progressive tax is needed, or how to institute a progressive tax in theory, 
but how to institute one in practice. It instantly became a classic. 
  Bill’s blind spot was politics, and the politics of implementation derailed many of 
his practical policies. But, in many ways, that blind spot was his strength as well. Bill 
created simple, practical proposals that were administratively feasible, but were undiluted 
by political concerns. This kept them clear and clean. 
  This collection of Bill’s writings is primarily concerned with macro policy issues, 
and thus includes some of Bill’s lesser-known work. It is a collection that Bill would 
have wanted to get out to the public because he felt that a solid macro policy was 
necessary to create a foundation of equity and efficiency before one can even start talking 
about micro policy.  
  Bill began to focus on macro policy in the 1980s, and in his presidential address 
to the AEA, which is reprinted here, he argued that we need to approach macro policy in 
a fundamentally different way than we are currently doing. He argued that we need to 
focus on full employment and not be limited by an ambiguous and unimplementable 
concept such as the natural rate. In those views he was in broad agreement on most of the 
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propositions that the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability has made its core 
focus. I attended that address and I remember overhearing two young economists sitting 
in front of me as they shook their heads and asked, “Who is this kook? Is he for real?” 
While the majority of macro economists would have been far more subtle and polite, they 
would have agreed in principle with that assessment. Somehow, the thought, in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, that you could expand the economy significantly below the then 
perceived 6.5 percent natural rate of unemployment qualified Bill as a kook.  
  Bill knew how the profession felt, and it didn’t bother him; after all, in micro, he 
had been considered a kook until the profession caught up with him. And, in 
transportation, he had roller skated to work back in the 1950s, predating by 40 years the 
roller blading craze. Being years ahead of the profession was a standard operating policy 
for Bill.  
Bill's Early Work in Macro 
  Since it isn’t well known, let me briefly discuss Bill’s early work in macro. Many 
will be surprised to hear that there was any early work, but, in fact, in 1963 he wrote a 
macro text, Metastatics and Macroeconomics. In that book he set out his basic 
understanding of macro issues. The first thing one sees when reading that book is that 
Bill saw macro as an extension of micro; his 1963 framing of the macro problem in a 
general equilibrium micro perspective occurred years before others caught up with him 
and created New Classical economics. In the first part of that book he discussed 
metastatics, which he defined as an analysis of change through time in which uncertainty 
is excluded. In it he developed a general metastatic intertemporal equilibrium in a 
hypothetical futures economy “as a prelude” to dealing with macro issues. 
  Of course, Bill wasn’t much at marketing; entitling the book “Metastatics” was 
not a wise marketing move. Had he chosen “New Classical Economics with Rational 
Expectations,” which has essentially the same definition, he may have had more 
marketing luck.  
  Bill’s impatience with theorizing for the sake of theorizing shows up in that book. 
Bill’s interest in theory always flowed from policy issues. Thus, since he could intuit the 
policy result of his general equilibrium metastatic model—perfect markets working 
perfectly always lead to the conclusion that government should not intervene—he had no 
interest in expanding and formalizing metastatics as modern researchers have done. 
Instead, Bill saw metastatics as a logical, neat first step into the interesting issues of 
macro dynamics. This, of course, was the case of many early Keynesians, and if younger 
economists spent a bit more time reading the work of those economists on whose 
shoulders they are standing, and less time assuming their Keynesian predecessors were 
dumbbells who failed to understand metastatic intertemporal issues, the profession would 
be much further along in its understanding of macro than it currently is.  
  The point is that Vickrey, and many early Keynesians, saw nothing inconsistent 
between a dynamic interpretation of Keynesian economics and their view of metastatic 
general equilibrium. Such a perfect foresight equilibrium was so far from reality that to 
waste time studying it would violate the law of significant digits. Their interest was in 
dynamic inconsistency issues—issues that they recognized were beyond the 
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mathematical tools available to them, and thus inappropriate for formal study. It is only 
now, in the 21
st century, with the development of the science of complexity, that such 
formal work begins to make sense. And what that new work tells us is that Keynesian 
economics has a potentially solid theoretical foundation in a framework of intertemporal 
dynamics with uncertainty, just as Bill argued it did in his metastatics book.  
  Bill was not interested in exploring theory for theory’s sake: He was essentially 
an economic engineer whose interest was policy; theory for Bill was a way to understand 
the economy so that he could design policies and new institutions to make the economy 
operate more efficiently and fairly. For Bill, economists were the economy’s investment 
in institutional technological change.  
  Bill’s interest in macro theory followed from his interest in policy, and in his 
1963 book his reading of the macro policy was relatively clear. We had the tools to 
expand the economy, but we did not have the tools to see that that expansion resulted in 
real output growth rather than inflation, nor did we have an acceptable braking system to 
slow the economy down without causing a recession.  
A Simple Idea 
  I am pleased that I had a small role in Bill’s interest returning to macro. Bill was 
intrigued by a little paper I wrote in 1974 called “The Free Market Solution to Inflation.” 
The idea in that paper was a simple one: Let’s say that, instead of its current institutional 
structure, the economy had a different institutional structure in which rights to change 
nominal prices were rationed in the following way: Suppliers could lower or raise their 
nominal prices only if they found other suppliers who would agree to raise or lower their 
nominal value added weighted prices by an offsetting amount. Such an economy, I 
argued, could have no inflation problem. 
  Bill was intrigued by my simple idea. It was, for him, a major breakthrough in our 
understanding of the institutional structural change we needed in our real-world economy 
to solve the inflation problem. It would allow the level of inflation to be institutionally 
set, and, by doing so, would allow the economy to reach a preferable real equilibrium.  
  This view needs some explanation since it is quite inconsistent with the "natural 
rate" view of aggregate equilibrium, which has become the new orthodoxy. Bill, and 
most early Keynesians, did not accept the concept of a unique natural rate of 
unemployment. Bill saw the economy as capable of achieving a variety of unemployment 
equilibria. Which one it achieved was dependent on expectations, government policy, and 
institutions. Thus, Bill considered our economy a multiple equilibria economy. Unique 
equilibria existed only in an irrelevant-for-policy metastatic general equilibrium model.  
  Bill did not try to develop his model from micro foundations; the 
interrelationships in the economy were too complicated for that. Instead, he formulated 
his concept of aggregate equilibrium as a systemic concept—one in which the dynamic 
pressures pushing the price level up equaled the dynamic pressures pushing the price 
level down. Within the range of unemployment where our economy generally operated—
between 4 and 8 percent unemployment—these inflationary pressures were only 
minimally affected by aggregate demand. Moreover, core inflationary pressures were 
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subject to significant shifting around due to institutional changes and random events. 
Inflation was primarily a supply side/expectational phenomenon. In such a systemic 
model, equilibrium is still brought about by individual decision makers, but the 
connection between the market incentives they face and the aggregate equilibrium 
outcomes their decisions lead to are too tenuous for individuals to take their contribution 
to the aggregate equilibrium into account in their decision making; thus, individual 
rationality does not imply collective rationality.  
The Short-Run/Long-Run Connection 
  The macro policy question for Bill was: What policies should we use to get the 
economy to a desirable equilibrium? His support of substantial deficits can be understood 
in this light. Bill believed that within the economy’s standard operating range, a deficit, 
combined with expansionary monetary policy, would push the economy to a preferred 
short-run equilibrium. Doing so would create new patterns of trade, coordination, and 
technology, increasing productivity and thereby leading the economy to a preferred long-
run equilibrium. 
  This short-run/long-run connection was central to Vickrey's, and early 
Keynesians', analysis of the economy, and underlay their support for expansionary 
aggregate demand management policy. The long-run equilibrium toward which the 
economy gravitated depended upon what short-run equilibrium government policy led it 
to.  
  Expressed in modern terminology: Expansionary aggregate demand policy 
influences the long-run equilibrium through its effect on the equilibrium selection 
mechanism. The unique equilibrium natural rate model misses that effect since it assumes 
away the need for an equilibrium selection mechanism. 
   If one accepts Bill's view of how a short-run expansion can lead to a preferred 
long-run equilibrium, Keynes’s quip that "in the long run we’re all dead" has been 
seriously misinterpreted. It should not be interpreted as meaning that we should forget 
about the long run; instead, it should be interpreted as meaning that the long-run 
equilibrium is dependent on the short-run equilibrium we choose. Specifically, in the 
1930s, early Keynesians believed, I think correctly, that unless we dealt with the short-
run problems, our economic system would not survive. Abba Lerner clarified this when 
he said, “In the long run we are simply in another short run.”  
  To clarify their views further, what should be added to that is that the short-run 
equilibrium we find ourselves in, in the long run, depends on the short-run policies we 
adopt now. If Bill's views were right, throughout the 1990s we have been operating at 
lower output than was possible and economists' unique natural rate vision has cost our 
society hundreds of billions of dollars of forgone achievable output. This was the 
message Bill wanted to get out.  
The Death of the Natural Rate Theory 
  For those of us interested in the spread of ideas, the introduction of the natural 
rate as the fulcrum for economic policy is an interesting case study. It caught on because 
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it fit the data of the 1970s better than did the standard Phillips curve. It has, however, 
never provided an especially good statistical fit with the data, and in the 1990s, it failed 
miserably. In terms of predicting how much room existed for expansion in the 1990s, 
most economists, with the exception of a few such as Bill Vickrey and Bob Eisner, had 
serious egg on their face. Given recent experience it is clear that the natural rate theory 
has provided a false certainty about policy prescriptions. It should long ago have been 
declared dead, just as the false certainty of fine-tuning was declared dead some 30 years 
ago.  
The Natural Range Theory 
  The death of the natural rate theory raises the question: What theory are we going 
to replace it with? I suggest a far less certain theory, one that reflects our actual 
knowledge of the economy. This theory might be called a natural range of unemployment 
theory--a theory that sees a range of non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment 
equilibria as possible. This range is institutionally determined, and, for the United States, 
is somewhere between 3 to 4 percent unemployment on the bottom side, and 8 to 9 
percent unemployment on the high side. The macroeconomic policy debate is primarily 
about what the appropriate policy should be within the range, with a secondary policy 
debate concerning the size of the range. Once the economy is outside this range, there is 
little policy debate. 
  I am attracted to this natural range theory because it is encompassing enough to 
accept both Bill’s view of the economy and the current mainstream view. These views 
differ about the nature of the tradeoff within the natural range. Bill's view paralleled that 
of Abba Lerner’s that, within this natural range, there was essentially no 
inflation/unemployment tradeoff. Alternatively expressed, within this range, the Phillips 
curve is flat, and aggregate demand has little effect on inflation. If this theory is true it 
suggests that the relationship between deviations of unemployment and inflation are 
nonlinear, and the statistical fit we get between increases in inflation and unemployment 
comes primarily from the extremes, not from small deviations.  
  This natural range theory is much more inclusive than the natural rate theory. It 
accepts, as Bill did, that current standard economic theories are relevant outside the 
natural range. Given the current U.S. economy's structural characteristics, below 3 to 4 
percent total unemployment, aggregate demand creates inflationary pressure, and causes 
inflation. Above 8 to 9 percent unemployment, cutting aggregate demand will eliminate 
inflation and, depending on institutional characteristics of the economy, it may actually 
create deflationary pressures. But it also is consistent with Bill’s view that within the 4 to 
8 percent range, the standard relationship breaks down, and one must look elsewhere for 
ways to fight inflation.  
  Unlike the standard Phillips curve, or the natural rate theory, a natural range 
theory is consistent with both the 1970s and the 1990s experiences of the economy. The 
1970s inflation was caused by major nominal upward price shocks, combined with wage- 
and price-setting institutions conducive to inflation, both of which became built into 
expectations of inflation. The 1990’s and early 2000’s lack of inflation, in spite of 
expanding aggregate demand, was due to (1) nominal downward price shocks, (2) wage- 
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and price-setting institutions experiencing significant international competition, and (3) 
the building of the above structural characteristics into expectations of declining inflation.  
Dealing with the Inflation Problem 
  Bill's view does not mean that inflation cannot be a problem; it simply means that 
within the 4 to 8 percent range, inflation is a separable problem from unemployment. 
Within that range, inflation is best dealt with by means other than contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policy. Contractionary policies to fight inflation simply add to the 
misery index without significantly reducing inflation. Running contractionary aggregate 
demand policy to fight inflation is the modern equivalent to the practice of blood letting 
to cure diseases; it piles one misery onto another, without doing any significant good.  
  Unemployment, for Bill, was an immoral way of holding down inflation. Given 
our institutions, the burden of that unemployment was borne unequally by the poor and 
the less well-off, which meant that not only was it inefficient, it was also unfair. Thus, 
even if he were wrong in his assessment that reducing unemployment to less than 4 
percent would not generate accelerating inflation, he said he would still advocate doing 
so. His answer to those who said that the result would be that government would be 
forced to change policy and induce a recession was: No; fighting inflation by keeping the 
poor and less well-off unemployed should violate society's collective normative 
judgment. He followed Beveridge in believing that it is society's job to create more 
positions than job seekers, so that firms do the primary searching for workers, not 
workers for jobs.  
  The appropriate policy, if an inflation were started, would be a change the 
institutions of the economy so that the lower unemployment rate is consistent with no 
inflation. You don't accept a normatively unacceptable rate of unemployment as an 
equilibrium.  
The Free Market Solution to Inflation 
  It is here where my free market solution to inflation, later renamed MAP (the 
market anti inflation plan) by Abba Lerner and myself, came in. Bill saw MAP as the 
institutional change needed to guarantee that a true full employment—roughly 2 to 3 
percent unemployment—could be reached in a way that was institutionally compatible 
with a non-inflationary economy. And it could do so in a way that was fully consistent 
with existing institutions.  
  To see why, consider the following questions: Assuming there were property 
rights on value-added prices, what would the price of raising price be, and what 
implication for the economy's natural rate would a positive price of raising price have? 
The answers are simple: By definition, assuming there were no inflationary pressures, the 
price of raising price would be zero. If there were a positive price of raising price, then 
MAP would be eliminating inflation pressure; the higher the price of raising price, the 
more inflationary pressure it would be eliminating. 
  To emphasize that the purpose of this program was to allow real growth, rather 
than to stop inflation, in his recent work Vickrey had started to call the rights to change 
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prices "growth warrants." Here's how the growth warrants were allocated: All firms are 
allowed warrants equal to their level of value added at the initial starting period. Each 
year firms receive additional warrants equal to the average increase in productivity in the 
economy. Thus, all firms are allowed nominal raises in input prices consistent with a non-
inflationary economy—that is, increases in growth warrants equal to the average total 
factor input productivity.  
  When firms hire additional workers, or invest more, they receive additional 
growth warrants equal to the value of those inputs in their previous use. This means that 
firms increasing their inputs would receive additional growth warrants, and firms 
decreasing their inputs without lowering their value-added price would be forced to buy 
additional warrants. This would create inflows of capital to growing firms from firms 
who were monopolizing—increasing their value added per input. That's why the plan can 
also be seen as a tax on monopolization.  
  A positive price of growth warrants would encourage hiring and price cuts. The 
MAP plan is a type of synthetic competition that modifies our current institutional 
structure so that it acts as if it is more competitive than it actually is.  
  There are many technical and practical issues that need to be answered before 
these plans can become reality. Concern about these issues kept many economists who 
supported the plan in principle from supporting it in practice. However, no serious 
attempt was made to deal with these issues. Bill felt that all of these practical and 
technical issues had answers—not perfect answers, but answers—and that a major effort 
should be undertaken to resolve them. It never was undertaken because, politically, such 
a major institutional change was not in the cards.  
  The higher the price of these growth warrants, the higher the cost in 
administrative expenses and misallocated resources. But the higher the price of these 
growth warrants, the lower the achievable unemployment rate. Thus, the imposition of 
this plan would present government with a new tradeoff—the systemic gain in aggregate 
efficiency against the administrative costs of the plan.  
  The plan has one other major advantage: It will allow a much more precise use of 
monetary policy. This follows since the price of growth warrants would give us a direct 
measure of the inflationary pressures in the economy. We would no longer need to 
operate monetary policy blind; instead we could set a monetary rule based on the price of 
these growth warrants.  
  Bill was much more of a visionary than I, and much more willing to argue that 
MAP was ready for prime time. I do not know whether MAP actually is workable in 
practice, or whether the politics of inflation control could ever change sufficiently so that 
it could be tried; however, I will argue that it should be explored in much greater detail 
than it has been. I will also say that there are large potential gains from it, and, it was 
precisely the type of actual policy that Bill could see working in practice that other 
economists could not.  
Functional Finance and Vickrey’s View of Deficits.  
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  The second macro policy issue on which Bill differed from the mainstream profession’s 
view was on the issue of budget deficits. In the 1990s there was much talk (by both Democrats 
and Republicans) about how bad deficits were, and very few economists objected to that talk. 
Bill did object. Since there remained substantial unemployment during those years that deficit 
spending could reduce, Bill felt that economists should point out that much of the political 
rhetoric on deficits was at best confused, and often just pain wrong.  
  Bill’s approach to budget deficits can best be described as the functional finance 
approach. The functional finance approach sees deficits as neither inherently good nor bad. They 
should be judged, as should all macro actions, in relation to “the results of these actions on the 
economy and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound and unsound.” 
(Abba Lerner, Social Research, 1943 p. 39.) Like most true functional finance supporters, Bill 
had an almost visceral reaction to fear of deficits based upon some of the false arguments against 
deficits that are generally made. Those arguments don’t hold water logically, and Bill wanted the 
world to know that they did not hold water.  
  In the early 2000s the political views on deficits have changed, with Republicans urging 
large budget deficits, and Democrats urging who knows what. I suspect that Bill would have had 
mixed views of these debates. As he states in his paper “Budget-Smudget: Why Balance What, 
How, and When?” (reprinted in this volume) the affect of the budget on achieving full 
employment would be the most important to him, followed by issues of progressivity, growth, 
efficiency and equity. On full employment grounds, he would have supported the Republican 
deficit proposals, but on progressivity grounds, I suspect he would not have. He would have 
favored a significantly different mix of taxes, such as those suggested in his “An Updated 
Agenda for Progressive Taxation” (reprinted in this volume). Wherever he actually would have 
come out on that policy, his views would have been known, and he would be taking strong 
stands. That’s why I pleased that Matt Forstater and the Center for Full Employment and Price 
Stability organized this book of Bill’s writings. It is what Bill would have wanted.  
 